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Examining the relationship between brain activity and religious fundamentalism, this
study explores whether fundamentalist religious beliefs increase responses to error-
related words among participants intolerant to uncertainty (i.e., high in the need for
closure) in comparison to those who have a high degree of toleration for uncertainty
(i.e., those who are low in the need for closure). We examine a negative-going
event-related brain potentials occurring 400 ms after stimulus onset (the N400) due
to its well-understood association with the reactions to emotional conflict. Religious
fundamentalism and tolerance of uncertainty were measured on self-report measures,
and electroencephalographic neural reactivity was recorded as participants were
performing an emotional Stroop task. In this task, participants read neutral words and
words related to uncertainty, errors, and pondering, while being asked to name the color
of the ink with which the word is written. The results confirm that among people who are
intolerant of uncertainty (i.e., those high in the need for closure), religious fundamentalism
is associated with an increased N400 on error-related words compared with people who
tolerate uncertainty well (i.e., those low in the need for closure).
Keywords: religious fundamentalism, need for closure, errors, brain activity, N400 component
INTRODUCTION
Religious fundamentalism has significantly shaped world history and continues to influence
individual attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Emerson and Hartman, 2006; Paloutzian and Park, 2014).
It represents a distinctive attitude of certainty as to the ultimate truth of one’s religious beliefs
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992, 2004). Most researchers emphasize its contributions to conflicts
around the world (Moaddel and Karabenick, 2008, 2013; Ginges et al., 2009; Neuberg et al.,
2014). Recently, however, researchers have demonstrated that it provides individuals with a sense
of meaning in life and that it offers relief from distress and uncertainty (Hood et al., 2005;
Williamson and Hood, 2014; Phillips and Ano, 2015; Kossowska et al., 2016). It also fosters self-
regulation and, more specifically, self-control (e.g., McCullough and Willoughby, 2009; Rounding
et al., 2012; McCullough and Carter, 2013). Self-control is needed to bring one’s behavior in line
with fundamentalist rules and standards. One possible way to increase the alignment between
rules and behavior is to monitor the environment as well as one’s own behaviors for errors
(Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996). Although previous studies focused on monitoring one’s own
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errors (Inzlicht et al., 2009; Senderecka et al., unpublished), in
this paper we examined participants’ responses to error-related
words. We tested the hypothesis that religious fundamentalism is
related to increased sensitivity to error-related words, especially
among people who are intolerant of uncertainty, i.e., those high
in the need for closure (NFC, Kruglanski, 1989). We test this
claim at the electrophysiological level. We claim that religious
fundamentalism causes people who are intolerant of uncertainty
to care more about errors. In that way, our study contributes to
the existing literature on the relationship between religiosity and
self-control.
Religious Fundamentalism, Self-Control,
and Error Sensitivity
Religious fundamentalism is here taken to be a collection of
infallible beliefs or principles that provide guidance regarding
how to obtain salvation. Religious fundamentalists believe in
the superiority of their religious teachings, and in a strict
division between righteous people and evildoers (Altemeyer and
Hunsberger, 1992, 2004). This belief system regulates religious
thoughts, but also all conceptions regarding the self, others, and
the world. It is a “meta-belief” – a worldview that provides
an absolute foundation for determining what to do in various
particular situations and for how to live in general (Altemeyer
and Hunsberger, 1992; Koltko-Rivera, 2006). Therefore, it helps
provide a sense of coherence and control, and it helps to reduce
ambiguity about the world (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992;
Pargament, 2002; Hood et al., 2005; Brandt and Reyna, 2010;
Williamson and Hood, 2014; Phillips and Ano, 2015; Kossowska
et al., 2016).
Indeed, research suggests that fundamentalists tend to believe
that they themselves control the outcomes of various events,
while non-fundamentalists are more sympathetic to the view
that such outcomes are influenced by others or by chance
(Silvestri, 1979; Tipton et al., 1980; Furnham, 1982). Moreover,
in their meta-analysis, McCullough and Willoughby (2009)
demonstrated that religious fundamentalism not only increases
the subjective feeling of control, but that it also fosters self-
regulation and, more specifically, self-control. Self-control is
the ability to direct one’s behavior in a way that is in line
with rules and standards that are meaningful (Baumeister
and Heatherton, 1996). By means of self-control, one may
refocus attention, alter one’s mood or emotional state, overcome
fatigue, resist temptation, or in various other ways change
one’s state of mind or one’s actions (Geyer and Baumeister,
2005). Baumeister and Exline (1999, 2000) have argued that in
order to behave virtuously, such as avoiding vice or sin, self-
control is necessary. Indeed, research has shown that religious
fundamentalism is positively related to temptation resistance, the
endurance of discomfort, the ability to delay gratification, and
response accuracy (e.g., Inzlicht and Tullett, 2010; Laurin et al.,
2012; Rounding et al., 2012; for a review see McCullough and
Willoughby, 2009).
One of the important components of successful self-
control is monitoring one’s performance, particularly for errors
(Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996). This is due to the fact
that in order to achieve important goals, people need be
aware of what they are doing and of how that behavior
compares to the standard for which they are striving. In
addition, errors are aversive. The commission of errors might
also be threatening, as they place the individual in unknown
danger (Hajcak and Foti, 2008; Hajcak, 2012; Spunt et al.,
2012). Errors provide both the suggestion and motivation
for correcting one’s behavior, and their correction can help
to guide behavior toward a desired goal state (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996). Thus, especially
under conditions of uncertainty, highly religious fundamentalist
people should efficiently monitor their behavior for errors.
Only by being aware of making mistakes can they direct their
behavior according to the standards expressed in fundamentalist
worldviews. Therefore, they should increase sensitivity to error-
related content.
However, the empirical support for this claim is limited and
mixed. For example, using neural correlates of performance
monitoring, i.e., an event-related potential (ERP) called the error-
related negativity (ERN; Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al.,
1993), Inzlicht et al. (2009), Inzlicht and Tullett (2010), Good
et al. (2014) reported that religion causes people to care less
about making errors in the Stroop task. However, Senderecka
et al. (unpublished), using a stop signal task, found significantly
larger error-related negativity, correct-related negativity, and
post-error positivity components in high (vs. low) religious
fundamentalists, pointing to their increased engagement in error
response monitoring. In explaining these inconsistencies, the
researchers argue that the crucial component of religious beliefs
that may facilitate self-control, thus increasing error responses,
is the belief in a punishing but not forgiving God (see also
Shariff and Norenzayan, 2011; Shariff and Rhemtulla, 2012).
If prominent in religious fundamentalists’ minds, this belief
may make them more aware of the discrepancies between
their imperfect performance and rigorous standards of correct
behavior. In studies by Senderecka et al. (unpublished), religious
fundamentalism was measured by the Pro-Fundamentalism Scale
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992), since it includes items
directly related to the concept of God’s punishment and the
necessity to obey His strict laws. On the other hand, studies by
Inzlicht et al. (2009) focused on measuring or priming religious,
but not fundamentalist, beliefs.
In the studies mentioned above, the researchers have focused
on monitoring one’s own activity and one’s own responses to
making errors. However, we suggest that the general sensitivity
to error-related events or words may also be considered
an important mechanism through which fundamentalism
facilitates self-control. Errors are not only aversive, but they
may provide important signals that external events pose a
threat to the fundamentalists’ worldview. Therefore, religious
fundamentalists, especially those for whom certainty is especially
important, should be more sensitive to error-related events as
potential signals of threat. We claim that increased sensitivity to
error-related words poses the threat to the sense of certainty.
Overview of the Study
We tested this hypothesis in an experimental study in which
we measured individual differences in religious fundamentalism.
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As the beneficial function of religious fundamentalism has been
mainly demonstrated under conditions of stress or uncertainty
(Hood et al., 2005; Williamson and Hood, 2014; Phillips and Ano,
2015; Kossowska et al., 2016), or among those who are especially
sensitive to distress and uncertainty (Brandt and Reyna, 2010;
for a review see, Pargament, 2007), we focused on individual
differences in intolerance of uncertainty, called the need for
closure (NFC, Kruglanski, 1989)1. NFC constitutes a fundamental
epistemic motive behind how people process information from
the social environment. It refers to the level of an individual’s
desire for clear and certain explanations, and importantly, those
explanations are desired over and above the person’s willingness
to accept ambiguity and uncertainty (Webster and Kruglanski,
1994). Thus, intolerance of uncertainty is a fundamentally
important element of cognitive closure. Recently, this claim has
been supported by neuropsychological analyses (Kossowska et al.,
2014). We predicted that high religious fundamentalism would
be related to increased sensitivity to error-related events among
those who are intolerant of uncertainty (i.e., high in NFC), but
not among those who tolerate uncertainty (i.e., low in NFC).
We hypothesized that the expected enhanced response to
errors may be observed neurophysiologically. Research using
ERP has shown that the N400, a negative-going deflection
peaking around 400 ms poststimulus onset, is primarily involved
in processing information related to semantics and violations
of meaning (Kutas and Hillyard, 1984; Kutas and Federmeier,
2000). Although initially discovered when participants examined
incongruent words in sentences, researchers have recently
demonstrated that N400 is also elicited by incongruent words
and knowledge about the self and the world (van den Brink et al.,
2001). A social psychological interpretation of this finding is that
the N400 encodes the violation of expectancy which arises from
people’s assumptions about the world and the self (van Berkum
et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2014). Due to its important role in the
processing of assumption violations and expectancy, the N400 is
a component of ERP that may also encode information related
to emotional or social conflict (White et al., 2009; Chen and
Spence, 2010). The stronger the conflict, the higher the N400
(more negative mean/peak voltages).
We expected that religious fundamentalism among people
intolerant to uncertainty would be related to more intense
processing of error-related stimuli (increased N400 amplitude)
compared to those who tolerate uncertainty well. As explained
above, errors violate the religious fundamentalists’ expectations
of being correct in their behaviors and always following the
rules. Therefore, error-related events are signals that there is a
possible threat that the rules may be broken, which can lead to
1There are many constructs related to uncertainty as intolerance of uncertainty
(Buhr and Dugas, 2002), tolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962) or uncertainty
orientation (Sorrentino et al., 1992). They differ each other as it was
demonstrated in many studies. We deliberately chose the NFC as it constitutes
a fundamental epistemic motive underlying how people approach and process
social information. From social psychology perspective NFC is important construct
with solid theoretical background and well established social and cognitive effects
systematically tested for over 30 years (see Roets et al., 2015). In addition, the NFC
scale is well tested in cultural context of the study. It will be important, however,
to test all of these constructs in religious context but it should be the goal of future
studies.
misbehaviors, or at least to deviations from valued standards.
Thus, religious fundamentalists should be sensitive not only to
their own errors, but also to any event in the environment
that suggests possible errors. To test this assumption, while
participants were performing an emotional Stroop task (EST),
we recorded the electroencephalographic activity of the brain
(EEG) (McKenna and Sharma, 1995). In the EST, participants
read the words, while being asked to name the color of the
ink with which the words were written (McKenna and Sharma,
1995). Klein (1964) and Dalgleish (2005) have argued that the EST
produces interference in information-processing not only due to
the semantic meaning associated with the word, but also due to
the emotional content reflecting an individual’s implicit attitudes,
motivations, and emotions. Throughout numerous variations of
the EST, it has been consistently found that people have difficulty
ignoring the meaning of a word while naming the color in which
it is written (Johnson and Hasher, 1987; Salo et al., 2001). It
is then not surprising that when the words relate directly to
the participants, higher response latencies result (Logan and
Goetsch, 1993). In our experiments we use neutral words, as
well as words related to uncertainty, errors, and pondering.
We expected an interference effect for error-related words, but
not for words related to uncertainty or pondering. As only
words related to errors are inconsistent with fundamentalist
views of correct behavior, they may be particularly unexpected,
emotionally salient, or otherwise attention grabbing, and thus
they might call for intensified processing of meaning, thereby
elevating the N400.
The experimental procedure followed the ethical principles
described in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical
Organization, 1996) and was approved by the Research Ethic
Committee at the Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University.
The written informed consent was obtained from the participants
of this study. The study was run in 2013.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Before the experiment, a group of 295 students (242 women,
53 men, mean age = 24.75, SD = 4.58) filled out the short,
Polish version of the NFC Scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994;
Kossowska et al., 2012). The NFC scores (α = 0.72; M = 3.45;
SD = 0.65), roughly normally distributed, were used to create
two groups with higher (>90th percentile) and lower (<10th
percentile) psychometric NFC scores. Thus, only 67 participants
were invited to the experiment (41 women, mean age = 24.36,
SD = 5.48) and only 42 accepted our invitation and show up in
the laboratory (34 women, mean age = 23.60, SD = 4.78). For
purpose of this study we decided to preselect participants based
on their NFC levels as the effect we study is expected to occur only
under uncertainty or among people sensitive for uncertainty. In
addition, due to the specificity of EEG studies (they are costly,
time-consuming and difficult for participants), we intentionally
used small sample sizes (see Preacher et al., 2005).
All of the participants had normal or corrected to normal
vision and normal hearing. All of the participants reported that
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they did not have any neurological or psychiatric disorders,
including drug abuse, and that they were not on any medications
during the experiment. They signed an informed consent and
received 20 PLN (roughly €5) for their participation. Data from
three participants were not included in the analysis because
on pre-processing data stage problems with recording and due
to excessive muscle artifacts reviled in them. The remaining
39 participants2 (33 women, 6 men) had a mean age of 23.67
(SD = 4.94). All of them self-reported as being religious, and as
having been brought up in Christianity.
Measures/Procedure
The experiment was run in a sound-attenuated cabin. At the
start of the experiment, participants filled out the Religious
Fundamentalism Scale (RFS; Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992)
which assesses one’s attitude toward religious belief in a way that
is independent from any specific religion and any particular set
of religious beliefs. This scale defines religious fundamentalism
along four dimensions: (1) the belief that there is a single set of
religious teachings containing the fundamental, basic, intrinsic,
inerrant truth about the deity and humanity; (2) this essential
truth stands in opposition to evil, which must be actively fought;
(3) the truth is to be followed in our current day according to the
fundamental practices of the past; and (4) people who succeed in
following these fundamental teachings have a special relationship
with the deity. The scale contains 12 statements that participants
assess on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = “Strongly Agree” to
5 = “Strongly Disagree.” Higher scores indicate a higher level of
religious fundamentalism. The reliability of the scale obtained
on the current sample was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.70,
M = 2.89, SD = 0.87). Participants then once again filled out the
NFC Scale to check test–retest stability [r(39) = 0.91, p < 0.001].
All participants stayed within previous category of high and
low NFC.
Participants were then asked to perform the EST, as adapted
from Smith and Waterman (2003). This computerized version
of the EST consisted of a series of words (neutral terms and
those related to errors, pondering, and uncertainty) printed in
one of four different colors (yellow, red, green, or blue), and
grouped in four blocks. The words were selected based on a
pilot study. The words used in the procedure are presented in
Table 1. Participants were instructed to name the font color of a
presented word and to neglect its meaning. After 28 practice trials
(for the training session numerals – one, two, etc. – were used
instead of the words), participants were given 40 experimental
trials per block. In each trial, a word was presented for 200 ms;
the maximum time for a response was restricted to 2200 ms. The
blocks were presented in a random order. A 22′′ computer screen
2following the suggestion of study being underpowered we have performed the
statistical power post hoc analysis (using G∗Power 3.1.9.2, Faul et al., 2009) to verify
how likely it was to observe a statistically significant interaction on the N4 in our
study. To this aim, we focused on paradigm in which the N4 component is studied
aside of directly linguistic context. The analysis was based on the sample size we
used in our experiment (N = 39) and alpha was defined as classical 0.05 level. The
effect size was based on the literature when reported N400 effect is either medium
or large. To be secure we used in our post hoc analysis medium one, so Cohen’s
f = 0.39. Given our sample size it is revealed we had 97% power to detect a true N4
component.
TABLE 1 | Words used in the emotional Stroop task (EST).
Error trails Uncertainty trails Pondering trails Neutral trails
Blunder Anxiety Options Piece
Error Uncertainty Problem Title
Punishment Apprehension Examination Window
Mistake Doubt Reflection Gate
Defeat Risk Thinking Box
Slip Ambiguity Discussion Hour
Rebuke Unknown Hesitation Curtain
Critique Instability Contemplation Teaspoon
Reprimand Variability Philosophy Umbrella
was placed approximately 70 cm away from the participants. The
procedure was programmed in PsychoPy software. Both reaction
times (RT) and identification accuracy related to the emotional
words (error, uncertainty, and pondering) are compared to the
scores related to neutral words, and the difference (interference
score) is understood to be the result of interference arising from
the words’ emotional content (Wentura et al., 2000; Larsen et al.,
2006).
Electroencephalography Recording
The EEG signal was recorded during the participants’ completion
of the EST using a Biosemi Active Two device equipped with 64
active electrodes placed on a 10–10 headcap, and two electrodes
placed on the left and right mastoids for off-line linked mastoid
reference. Additional four leads were located above and below
the right eye and in the external canthi of both eyes. The signal
was sampled at 256 Hz frequency and filtered using 46 Hz low-
pass and 0.1 Hz high-pass zero-phase digital filters. Oculomotor
correction was carried out using Least Mean Squares (LMS)
regression (Gómez-Herrero, 2007). After data epoching (−100 to
800 ms) a 100 µV rejection threshold was set to exclude segments
contaminated with potential artifacts.
Event-Related Potentials
Evoked potentials were analyzed time-locked to the stimuli onset
with baseline correction using the −100 to 0 ms epoch. The
N400 component was defined as averaged activity from the POz,
CPz, and Pz sites in the 300–500 ms time window. Differences
of the resulting N400 values between uncertainty, errors, and
ponder blocks and the neutral block were considered. As N400
is a negative component, the lower the index means the stronger
interference.
RESULTS
The emotional Stroop interference effect for ERP, RT and
accuracy was computed as the difference between the
experimental trials and the neutral words. For each experimental
measure (separately for all trial types, i.e., pondering, uncertainty
and error) the respective value related to neutral words were
subtracted. The obtained results were used as dependent
variables in all further analysis. To test our hypothesis, we ran
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 285
fpsyg-09-00285 March 26, 2018 Time: 17:49 # 5
Kossowska et al. Religiosity and Brain Activity
a moderation model using PROCESS program (Hayes, 2013,
model 1, bootstrap 10,000) with religious fundamentalism as a
predictor and NFC as a moderator, for each of the dependent
variables. The moderator was coded (1 high NFC/0 low NFC).
Religious fundamentalism was centered.
Behavioral Results
We did not find any main effects of religious fundamentalism
or NFC, nor did we find an interaction between them for
interference index related to uncertainty, pondering and error at
the behavioral level of analysis, neither for RTs (ps > 0.3) nor
accuracy (ps > 0.8).
Electrophysiological Results
We did not observe any significant main effects of religious
fundamentalism or NFC nor did we find interactions between
them in interference effects for words related to uncertainty
and pondering (R2 = 0.01, b = −0.62, p = 0.620, 95% CI
[−3.12, 1.88]; R2 = 0.01, b = −0.63, p = 0.603, 95% CI [−3.05,
1.80], respectively). However, while we found no significant
main effect of religious fundamentalism in interference effect
for words related to error (b = 0.87, p = 0.254, 95% CI
[−0.65, 2.38]), there was a significant effect of NFC (b = 7.19,
p = 0.028, 95% CI [0.82, 13.56]) on N400 interference effect
for words related to error. Furthermore, the results revealed
a significant interaction between religious fundamentalism and
NFC (R2 = 0.12, b = −2.25, p = 0.038, 95% CI [−4.37,
−0.14]) on N400 interference effect for words related to error.
We then performed simple slope analyses because we were
interested in the relationship between religious fundamentalists
and N400 interference effect for words related to error for
low and high NFC separately. The analyses indicated that
religious fundamentalism was marginal negatively related to
N400 interference effect for words related to error for high NFC
individuals (b =−1.39, p = 0.064, 95% CI [−2.86, 0.09]), and was
positively but non-significantly related for low NFC participants
(b = 0.87, p = 0.254, 95% CI [−0.65, 2.38]). We present the
illustration of the interaction between NFC and Fundamentalism
on Stroop effect index based on real calculations, with provided
by Process Macro data for plots on Figure 1. In addition, for
illustrative purpose we present ERPs’ plots for high NFC group
on Figure 2.
DISCUSSION
Researchers claim that there is a link between self-control
and religion (McCullough and Carter, 2013). They suggest
that religion helps promote delayed gratification, prosocial
tendencies, and other socially adaptive behaviors (Baumeister
and Exline, 2000). Explaining the link between self-control
and religion, they suggest that by making salient the belief in
an ever-watchful God (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008) religion
may in effect encourage self-monitoring (see McCullough
and Willoughby, 2009). This belief may also increase
concerns with punishment, by focusing one’s attention on
the image of a punishing and not forgiving or loving God
(Shariff and Norenzayan’s, 2011). Religious concepts may also
bring reputational concerns to the fore and this increased
salience may in turn promote more self-monitoring (Rounding
et al., 2012). The empirical support for these claims is, however,
very limited and mixed.
In this preliminary study we argue that religious beliefs, in
a fundamentalist form, are linked to monitoring for errors,
an important component of self-control (Baumeister and
Heatherton, 1996). Errors are aversive as they distort the pleasant
and stable pictures one might have of the self and the world,
and they thus destroy predictability. In addition, for people
with highly fundamentalist views that include standards for
correct behaviors and suggest strict rules to follow and severe
punishments for deviation from them, errors should pose a
special threat. A fundamentalist view may also make people more
aware of the discrepancies between their imperfect performance
and the rigorous standards of correct behavior. We claim that
not only errors related to one’s own performance, but also those
signaling possible dangers in environment, should play the same
role. To further develop this idea, we focused on the link between
religious fundamentalism and responses to error-related words.
Thus, the aim of the current study was to examine whether
religious fundamentalism is related to altered self-control evinced
as sensitivity to error-related words among participants highly
intolerant of uncertainty (high NFC) compared to those with
a high tolerance of uncertainty (low NFC). The results of our
study indicate that religious fundamentalism and intolerance
to uncertainty differentiate electrophysiological measures related
to error monitoring. In particular, we found significantly
larger error-related brain activity in the N400 for religious
fundamentalism in the high NFC group (decreased interference
index), although N400 decreased for religious fundamentalism
among participants low in NFC. Behaviorally, however, there
were no significant differences between these groups on RTs or
accuracy. Thus, our results may reflect an increased orienting
response toward error-related stimuli, related to autonomic
nervous system activity (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2003; Wessel et al.,
2011).
Many studies have demonstrated the palliative function of
religious beliefs, also in fundamentalist forms, under conditions
of uncertainty (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2009; Inzlicht and Tullett,
2010). Indeed, across samples as diverse as members of
community churches, college students, and the hospitalized
elderly, researchers have found that strong religious belief is
connected with beneficial outcomes related to stress, such as
better overall mental health and higher reported levels of stress-
related growth (for a review see Pargament, 2007). To build on
this previous research, in our study we measured intolerance
to uncertainty understood as the need for closure, believing
that among people highly intolerant to uncertainty, religious
fundamentalism may play this defensive role. In this regard,
increased sensitivity to error-related events may be considered a
defensive mechanism. Detecting errors may allow one to bring
their behavior in line with fundamentalist rules and standards.
Our findings are in line with a recent study by Senderecka
et al. (unpublished) showing that high levels of religious
fundamentalism were associated with a larger ERN/CRN
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FIGURE 1 | Interaction between need for closure (NFC) and Fundamentalism on Stroop effect index (N400 for error words – N400 for neutral words). The more
negative score, the stronger interference. For religious fundamentalism –1 SD, +1 SD values were used.
FIGURE 2 | Event-related potential (ERP) plots for high NFC group and median-split of fundamentalism scores averaged from the POz, Pz, CPz electrodes.
The N400 component is defined as a difference (black solid line) between average activity within the 300–500 ms window for error-related (dashed lines) minus
neutral (dotted lines) words. Gray polygons marks the time window of interests (300–500 ms), relative to words onset. Despite the absolute differences between
values, the statistical significance was found only for the high NFC slope and not for the low NFC. Without these statistical parameters, the ERP plots may be
misleading on a first sight. Moreover, the presented plots are provided only for illustrative purposes, and were created with median split of the variables. The results
that are considered in the manuscript were computed using continuous variables.
amplitude, indicating larger monitoring for error making. Thus,
these researchers suggest that people who are highly religiously
fundamentalist were more aware of their errors or found their
errors more motivationally salient and attention-engaging. It
is worth stressing that this study shows that when people
largely focus on God’s punishment and the necessity to obey
His strict laws (measured by the Pro-Fundamentalist Belief
Scale), discrepancies between expected and actual outcomes of
their behaviors evoke highly aversive cognitive conflict. In such
situations, both self-monitoring for errors and sensitivity to
events that may potentially signal errors in the environment
become especially important.
In our study, we used the Religious Fundamentalism Scale
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992), and not just some items
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directly related to the concept of God’s punishment and the
necessity to obey His strict laws. The studies were, however,
conducted in Poland where Catholicism places considerable
value on rule-following (Strzelczyk, 2016). Thus, it is highly likely
that our religious participants had this image of God in mind.
An alternative interpretation could be also mentioned, which
relates to the association of the N400 component to the semantic
integration within a more general context. People scoring high
on fundamentalism and NFC could be characterized with a
general tendency to avoid information that relates to uncertainty,
conflict or errors. Such defense tendency would make any
error-related semantic content less available in their cognitive
system. Observed increase of N400 response to presentation
of such words could be a manifest of incongruity with their
self-concept, where there is a limited acceptance of conflicting
tendencies and committing errors. The attempts to filter out
error-related information would also result in higher emotional
incongruity after being directly exposed to such evaded words.
We did not, however, observed significant effects on N400 by
uncertainty-related words, which makes above interpretation
more speculative.
There are, however, a few important limitations of the study.
The study shows a correlation between religious fundamentalism
and response-related brain activity; however, the causal direction
of this relationship is unclear. Further research is needed to
determine whether a fundamentalist mindset causes overactive
performance monitoring or, on the contrary, excessive behavioral
monitoring leads to religious fundamentalism. In addition,
fundamentalism was studied on quite a homogeneous sample of
young Polish Catholics. Thus, studying this effect across religions
and cultures will likely yield valuable insights.
Next, although small, low-powered studies are endemic in
neuroscience, they are also problematic (Larson and Carbine,
2017). It was recently recognized that low sample size of studies,
small effects or both, lead to low statistical power that negatively
affects the probability that a nominally statistically significant
finding actually reflects a true effect. For example, Button
et al. (2013) demonstrated a small sample size is responsible
for a low probability of replication, exaggerated estimates of
effects when a statistically significant finding is reported, and
poor positive predictive power of small sample effects. In
addition, due to small sample size we could not reliably test
the three-way interaction between the word type, NFC and
religious fundamentalism that would allow us to verify the
hypothesis that high religious fundamentalism accompanying
high intolerance of uncertainty is related to stronger reactions
to error-related words in comparison to ponder- or uncertainty-
related words. The results of such underpowered testing would
be simply inconclusive. It is worth noticing, however, that we
did not formulate the hypothesis in that way. We expected
an interference effect for error-related words, but not for
words related to uncertainty or pondering. Thus, we focused
on NFC × religious fundamentalism interaction tested for
interference in words related to error, pondering, and uncertainty
separately. This is of course not optimal strategy, but reasonable
having small sample available. Therefore, the results should be
treated with some caution and replications of the results would
be of great value. At the same time, we are sure that the study was
carefully prepared according to the standards in EEG research,
i.e., the time ranges and electrodes were selected based on typical
values in the N400 literature, and were not data- or significance-
driven. Thus, it may be treated as a good starting point for future
analysis.
Finally, in order to fully understand the psychological
processes underlying fundamentalist beliefs, it is important to
understand both their detrimental and their beneficial cognitive
functions. It is important to keep in mind that such research
is related to neither assertions of, nor denials of, the truth
value of such beliefs. The current study is important in that it
contributes to our understanding of the link between religious
fundamentalism and self-control.
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